// Global Analysis Archive
According to the source, US-led Geneva negotiations in February 2026 have stalled, reflecting long-standing incompatibilities over territory, sovereignty, and security alignment. Past mediation efforts show limited success on transactional measures (e.g., grain corridors, prisoner exchanges) but repeated failure to secure a comprehensive settlement.
Russia and Ukraine are set to hold US-brokered trilateral talks in Geneva on February 17–18, 2026, following earlier rounds in Abu Dhabi focused on buffer zones and ceasefire monitoring. The source indicates territorial demands in Donetsk and Ukraine’s pursuit of Western security guarantees remain the central obstacles amid continued infrastructure strikes and active diplomacy at the Munich Security Conference.
Putin’s overnight meeting with Trump’s envoys highlights renewed US-Russia engagement on a Ukraine settlement, with Moscow insisting territorial issues must be resolved to secure peace. Zelensky’s criticism of Europe’s fragmented response underscores a growing risk that Western cohesion weakens, increasing Russia’s leverage at the negotiating table.
The source argues China–Russia alignment after the Ukraine war is driven by systemic balancing against the US-led order, reinforced by expanding trade and visible military cooperation. It also highlights Russia’s regional hedging—engaging partners such as India and potentially China’s rivals—creating openings for third countries and limiting assumptions of a fixed bloc.
The source describes a growing recruitment ecosystem drawing Southeast Asian nationals toward the Russia–Ukraine conflict through both voluntary enlistment for pay and apparent deception via online job offers. Divergent national responses highlight gaps in interdiction, victim identification, and the diplomatic capacity needed once individuals cross borders.
The source argues that North Korean soldiers captured in Ukraine present a precedent-setting clash between Geneva Convention repatriation expectations and the non-refoulement principle. It assesses that credible fear of reprisal makes return to North Korea or Russia difficult, making prolonged Ukrainian custody and eventual transfer to South Korea the most likely outcome.
A June 2024 MERICS report argues that Russia’s war in Ukraine has tightened China–Russia alignment and transformed it into a complex security threat for Europe and transatlantic partners. The document highlights China’s economic and dual-use trade support for Russia and calls for clearer red lines and costs to change Beijing’s calculus while maintaining limited engagement on ending the war.
The source assesses that North Korea is unlikely to renew cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Complex despite renewed interest in Seoul, citing Pyongyang’s shift toward treating inter-Korean ties as hostile state-to-state relations. Asset absorption at Kaesong, information-control concerns, leverage asymmetry, and improved economic alternatives via Russia further reduce incentives for reopening.
According to the source, the Russia-Ukraine war has become a high-attrition drone conflict sustained by China-dominant commercial UAV platforms and components. This dual-use supply-chain centrality gives Beijing indirect leverage over both belligerents while accelerating Chinese learning for future unmanned, data-driven warfare.
An Ifri March 2023 analysis argues China–Russia ties are a realpolitik great-power partnership rather than a formal alliance, and the Ukraine war has exposed limits without causing a rupture. The report highlights accelerating power imbalance—Russia’s dependence on China is growing—while warning against conflating Beijing’s and Moscow’s distinct challenges to Western interests.
According to the source, China’s long-standing critical narrative toward NATO does not translate into a strategic preference for NATO’s collapse. The document argues NATO helps deter wider European escalation, limits unified Western pressure on China, and reduces the likelihood Beijing would be forced into high-stakes crisis management to restrain Russia.
According to the source, US-led Geneva negotiations in February 2026 have stalled, reflecting long-standing incompatibilities over territory, sovereignty, and security alignment. Past mediation efforts show limited success on transactional measures (e.g., grain corridors, prisoner exchanges) but repeated failure to secure a comprehensive settlement.
Russia and Ukraine are set to hold US-brokered trilateral talks in Geneva on February 17–18, 2026, following earlier rounds in Abu Dhabi focused on buffer zones and ceasefire monitoring. The source indicates territorial demands in Donetsk and Ukraine’s pursuit of Western security guarantees remain the central obstacles amid continued infrastructure strikes and active diplomacy at the Munich Security Conference.
Putin’s overnight meeting with Trump’s envoys highlights renewed US-Russia engagement on a Ukraine settlement, with Moscow insisting territorial issues must be resolved to secure peace. Zelensky’s criticism of Europe’s fragmented response underscores a growing risk that Western cohesion weakens, increasing Russia’s leverage at the negotiating table.
The source argues China–Russia alignment after the Ukraine war is driven by systemic balancing against the US-led order, reinforced by expanding trade and visible military cooperation. It also highlights Russia’s regional hedging—engaging partners such as India and potentially China’s rivals—creating openings for third countries and limiting assumptions of a fixed bloc.
The source describes a growing recruitment ecosystem drawing Southeast Asian nationals toward the Russia–Ukraine conflict through both voluntary enlistment for pay and apparent deception via online job offers. Divergent national responses highlight gaps in interdiction, victim identification, and the diplomatic capacity needed once individuals cross borders.
The source argues that North Korean soldiers captured in Ukraine present a precedent-setting clash between Geneva Convention repatriation expectations and the non-refoulement principle. It assesses that credible fear of reprisal makes return to North Korea or Russia difficult, making prolonged Ukrainian custody and eventual transfer to South Korea the most likely outcome.
A June 2024 MERICS report argues that Russia’s war in Ukraine has tightened China–Russia alignment and transformed it into a complex security threat for Europe and transatlantic partners. The document highlights China’s economic and dual-use trade support for Russia and calls for clearer red lines and costs to change Beijing’s calculus while maintaining limited engagement on ending the war.
The source assesses that North Korea is unlikely to renew cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Complex despite renewed interest in Seoul, citing Pyongyang’s shift toward treating inter-Korean ties as hostile state-to-state relations. Asset absorption at Kaesong, information-control concerns, leverage asymmetry, and improved economic alternatives via Russia further reduce incentives for reopening.
According to the source, the Russia-Ukraine war has become a high-attrition drone conflict sustained by China-dominant commercial UAV platforms and components. This dual-use supply-chain centrality gives Beijing indirect leverage over both belligerents while accelerating Chinese learning for future unmanned, data-driven warfare.
An Ifri March 2023 analysis argues China–Russia ties are a realpolitik great-power partnership rather than a formal alliance, and the Ukraine war has exposed limits without causing a rupture. The report highlights accelerating power imbalance—Russia’s dependence on China is growing—while warning against conflating Beijing’s and Moscow’s distinct challenges to Western interests.
According to the source, China’s long-standing critical narrative toward NATO does not translate into a strategic preference for NATO’s collapse. The document argues NATO helps deter wider European escalation, limits unified Western pressure on China, and reduces the likelihood Beijing would be forced into high-stakes crisis management to restrain Russia.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1328 | Geneva Talks Reopen a Crowded Mediation Track, but Territory Remains the Core Impasse | Russia-Ukraine War | 2026-02-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1117 | Geneva Trilateral Talks Signal Push for Ceasefire Mechanics as Donbas Dispute Hardens | Russia-Ukraine War | 2026-02-13 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-75 | Midnight Diplomacy: Putin Signals Peace Talks, But Territory Remains the Dealbreaker | Russia-Ukraine War | 2026-01-23 | 3 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-475 | Beyond a De Facto Alliance: Russia’s Indo-Pacific Hedging Complicates China–Russia Alignment | China-Russia | 2025-12-19 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-951 | Southeast Asia’s Emerging Recruitment Pipeline Into the Russia–Ukraine War | Southeast Asia | 2025-08-05 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-915 | North Korean POWs in Ukraine: Non-Refoulement, Repatriation Norms, and a Likely Transfer to South Korea | North Korea | 2025-07-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-474 | China–Russia Alignment After Ukraine: From Strategic Challenge to European Security Threat | China-Russia | 2024-11-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1186 | Kaesong’s Revival Faces Structural Headwinds as Pyongyang Prioritizes Separation and Russia-Linked Gains | North Korea | 2024-11-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-133 | China’s Quiet Leverage in Ukraine: Drone Supply Chains as Geopolitical Power | China | 2024-10-12 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-476 | Sino-Russian Partnership After Ukraine: Resilient Alignment, Rising Asymmetry | China-Russia relations | 2023-12-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-150 | Why NATO’s Survival May Quietly Serve Beijing’s Core Interests | NATO | 2022-12-28 | 1 | ACCESS » |