// Global Analysis Archive
Source material indicates the U.S. shifted in January 2026 to case-by-case licensing for certain advanced AI chip exports to China, paired with stringent compliance conditions and a cost-raising tariff structure. China is described as simultaneously refining its own export-control toolkit—selectively pausing some U.S.-focused licensing requirements while maintaining military end-use barriers and extending controls to other partners such as Japan.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
A Nov. 2025 China-US Focus analysis argues the Trump–Xi Busan meeting stabilized bilateral ties through limited trade and export-control de-escalation while producing no new strategic agreements. The article suggests technology competition and unresolved security issues—especially Taiwan and broader Indo-Pacific dynamics—remain the primary drivers of future volatility.
A 2012 UC San Diego/IGCC workshop report frames cybersecurity in China as a political-economy coordination problem shaped by fragmented institutions, uneven enforcement, and evolving military and civilian roles. It highlights rising domestic cybercrime, persistent attribution uncertainty in cross-border intrusions, and Chinese-cited 2011 indicators pointing to severe information-security challenges and a need for international cooperation.
Source material indicates the U.S. shifted in January 2026 to case-by-case licensing for certain advanced AI chip exports to China, paired with stringent compliance conditions and a cost-raising tariff structure. China is described as simultaneously refining its own export-control toolkit—selectively pausing some U.S.-focused licensing requirements while maintaining military end-use barriers and extending controls to other partners such as Japan.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
A Nov. 2025 China-US Focus analysis argues the Trump–Xi Busan meeting stabilized bilateral ties through limited trade and export-control de-escalation while producing no new strategic agreements. The article suggests technology competition and unresolved security issues—especially Taiwan and broader Indo-Pacific dynamics—remain the primary drivers of future volatility.
A 2012 UC San Diego/IGCC workshop report frames cybersecurity in China as a political-economy coordination problem shaped by fragmented institutions, uneven enforcement, and evolving military and civilian roles. It highlights rising domestic cybercrime, persistent attribution uncertainty in cross-border intrusions, and Chinese-cited 2011 indicators pointing to severe information-security challenges and a need for international cooperation.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1177 | U.S. Eases AI Chip Export Stance as Mutual Supply-Chain Leverage Drives a Transactional Semiconductor Regime | Semiconductors | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-839 | Deterrence and Escalation Dominance in the Taiwan Strait: Lessons from the 1996 Crisis | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-466 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Intensified Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-834 | Busan Summit Delivers Trade Truce, Defers Core U.S.-China Security Disputes | U.S.-China Relations | 2025-07-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-164 | China’s Cybersecurity Landscape: Fragmented Governance, Rising Domestic Threats, and Strategic Mistrust | Cybersecurity | 2012-07-27 | 1 | ACCESS » |