// Global Analysis Archive
A January 2026 CFR analysis assesses the new U.S. Commerce regulation allowing limited sales of advanced AI chips to China as strategically incoherent, with outcomes hinging on enforcement strictness. The document argues volume caps and certification-based safeguards may still permit large-scale compute transfers while remaining difficult to verify, potentially accelerating China’s AI and dual-use capabilities.
A January 2026 U.S. policy package pairs case-by-case export licensing for a defined tier of advanced AI chips to China/Macau with a 25% Section 232 tariff regime that often requires routing chips through the United States. The combined design supports U.S. onshoring and end-use oversight but raises costs and compliance burdens for reexport-oriented electronics manufacturing.
A January 2026 U.S. policy package relaxes export licensing review for certain mature advanced AI chips to China/Macau, but ties practical access to U.S.-departure shipments with extensive certifications and U.S.-based testing. A simultaneous 25% Section 232 tariff with no duty drawback for reexports raises costs and reshapes incentives toward U.S. semiconductor production while potentially discouraging export-oriented electronics assembly.
Source material indicates the U.S. shifted in January 2026 to case-by-case licensing for certain advanced AI chip exports to China, paired with stringent compliance conditions and a cost-raising tariff structure. China is described as simultaneously refining its own export-control toolkit—selectively pausing some U.S.-focused licensing requirements while maintaining military end-use barriers and extending controls to other partners such as Japan.
On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security announced a revised license review policy allowing case-by-case consideration of exports to China for Nvidia H200, AMD MI325X, and similar chips under specified security conditions. The framework emphasizes protection of supply available to U.S. customers, purchaser compliance controls, and U.S.-based third-party testing to verify performance and security.
A War on the Rocks commentary argues that the durability of economic leverage now depends on sustaining chokepoints, not merely creating them. Using the 2025 U.S.–China export-control escalation as a case, it concludes semiconductor controls are more precise and renewable over time than rare-earth restrictions, which accelerate substitution and impose domestic spillovers.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
A January 2026 Commerce Department regulation creates a conditional pathway for exporting advanced AI chips to China while acknowledging significant national security risks. The source argues the framework is difficult to enforce and could still enable large-scale compute expansion in China, while setting a precedent that may be extended to more advanced chip generations.
The source describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, featuring multi-zone maritime activity consistent with blockade rehearsal and high-tempo air operations. It also highlights uncertainty about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, alongside Taiwan’s subsequent counter-drills and U.S. calls for restraint.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
Source reporting indicates the U.S. shifted certain advanced semiconductor exports to China and Macau to case-by-case licensing in January 2026, while imposing volume caps, supply certifications, and tariff-linked routing requirements. China reportedly paused select enhanced export licensing measures for key dual-use and rare-earth-related materials until November 27, 2026, while retaining military end-use restrictions.
CRS’s September 2025 update shows U.S.-China trade remains large, but the U.S. deficit widened in 2024 as exports fell and imports rose. Policy has shifted toward strategic competition, with durable tariffs, expanding technology and data controls, forced-labor enforcement, and rising scrutiny of investment and de minimis trade channels.
Late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan featured unusually close-in activity and were described as practice for disrupting major air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited in the document assess the drills as a blockade-style test run and a strategic signal aimed at deterring potential U.S. involvement while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.
A large PLA exercise on Dec. 29–30, 2025 simulated blockade and amphibious seizure operations near Taiwan while China Coast Guard activity tested gray-zone thresholds. The episode sharpened U.S. congressional focus on accelerating arms transfers, but delivery backlogs and Taiwan’s domestic budget politics may constrain near-term deterrence.
China’s PLA conducted two days of drills around Taiwan on Dec. 29–30, including activity near the contiguous zone and simulated blockage of key air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited assess the drills as the largest since 2022, highlighting blockade signaling, civil disruption effects, and open questions about PLA sustainment under contested conditions.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills around Taiwan moved closer to the island and were assessed by analysts as practice for blocking key air and sea routes while signaling deterrence toward potential U.S. involvement. The exercise demonstrated short-duration disruption effects but, according to commentary in the source, left open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
A Nov. 2025 China-US Focus analysis argues the Trump–Xi Busan meeting stabilized bilateral ties through limited trade and export-control de-escalation while producing no new strategic agreements. The article suggests technology competition and unresolved security issues—especially Taiwan and broader Indo-Pacific dynamics—remain the primary drivers of future volatility.
A 2012 UC San Diego/IGCC workshop report frames cybersecurity in China as a political-economy coordination problem shaped by fragmented institutions, uneven enforcement, and evolving military and civilian roles. It highlights rising domestic cybercrime, persistent attribution uncertainty in cross-border intrusions, and Chinese-cited 2011 indicators pointing to severe information-security challenges and a need for international cooperation.
A January 2026 CFR analysis assesses the new U.S. Commerce regulation allowing limited sales of advanced AI chips to China as strategically incoherent, with outcomes hinging on enforcement strictness. The document argues volume caps and certification-based safeguards may still permit large-scale compute transfers while remaining difficult to verify, potentially accelerating China’s AI and dual-use capabilities.
A January 2026 U.S. policy package pairs case-by-case export licensing for a defined tier of advanced AI chips to China/Macau with a 25% Section 232 tariff regime that often requires routing chips through the United States. The combined design supports U.S. onshoring and end-use oversight but raises costs and compliance burdens for reexport-oriented electronics manufacturing.
A January 2026 U.S. policy package relaxes export licensing review for certain mature advanced AI chips to China/Macau, but ties practical access to U.S.-departure shipments with extensive certifications and U.S.-based testing. A simultaneous 25% Section 232 tariff with no duty drawback for reexports raises costs and reshapes incentives toward U.S. semiconductor production while potentially discouraging export-oriented electronics assembly.
Source material indicates the U.S. shifted in January 2026 to case-by-case licensing for certain advanced AI chip exports to China, paired with stringent compliance conditions and a cost-raising tariff structure. China is described as simultaneously refining its own export-control toolkit—selectively pausing some U.S.-focused licensing requirements while maintaining military end-use barriers and extending controls to other partners such as Japan.
On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security announced a revised license review policy allowing case-by-case consideration of exports to China for Nvidia H200, AMD MI325X, and similar chips under specified security conditions. The framework emphasizes protection of supply available to U.S. customers, purchaser compliance controls, and U.S.-based third-party testing to verify performance and security.
A War on the Rocks commentary argues that the durability of economic leverage now depends on sustaining chokepoints, not merely creating them. Using the 2025 U.S.–China export-control escalation as a case, it concludes semiconductor controls are more precise and renewable over time than rare-earth restrictions, which accelerate substitution and impose domestic spillovers.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
A January 2026 Commerce Department regulation creates a conditional pathway for exporting advanced AI chips to China while acknowledging significant national security risks. The source argues the framework is difficult to enforce and could still enable large-scale compute expansion in China, while setting a precedent that may be extended to more advanced chip generations.
The source describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, featuring multi-zone maritime activity consistent with blockade rehearsal and high-tempo air operations. It also highlights uncertainty about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, alongside Taiwan’s subsequent counter-drills and U.S. calls for restraint.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
Source reporting indicates the U.S. shifted certain advanced semiconductor exports to China and Macau to case-by-case licensing in January 2026, while imposing volume caps, supply certifications, and tariff-linked routing requirements. China reportedly paused select enhanced export licensing measures for key dual-use and rare-earth-related materials until November 27, 2026, while retaining military end-use restrictions.
CRS’s September 2025 update shows U.S.-China trade remains large, but the U.S. deficit widened in 2024 as exports fell and imports rose. Policy has shifted toward strategic competition, with durable tariffs, expanding technology and data controls, forced-labor enforcement, and rising scrutiny of investment and de minimis trade channels.
Late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan featured unusually close-in activity and were described as practice for disrupting major air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited in the document assess the drills as a blockade-style test run and a strategic signal aimed at deterring potential U.S. involvement while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.
A large PLA exercise on Dec. 29–30, 2025 simulated blockade and amphibious seizure operations near Taiwan while China Coast Guard activity tested gray-zone thresholds. The episode sharpened U.S. congressional focus on accelerating arms transfers, but delivery backlogs and Taiwan’s domestic budget politics may constrain near-term deterrence.
China’s PLA conducted two days of drills around Taiwan on Dec. 29–30, including activity near the contiguous zone and simulated blockage of key air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited assess the drills as the largest since 2022, highlighting blockade signaling, civil disruption effects, and open questions about PLA sustainment under contested conditions.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills around Taiwan moved closer to the island and were assessed by analysts as practice for blocking key air and sea routes while signaling deterrence toward potential U.S. involvement. The exercise demonstrated short-duration disruption effects but, according to commentary in the source, left open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
A Nov. 2025 China-US Focus analysis argues the Trump–Xi Busan meeting stabilized bilateral ties through limited trade and export-control de-escalation while producing no new strategic agreements. The article suggests technology competition and unresolved security issues—especially Taiwan and broader Indo-Pacific dynamics—remain the primary drivers of future volatility.
A 2012 UC San Diego/IGCC workshop report frames cybersecurity in China as a political-economy coordination problem shaped by fragmented institutions, uneven enforcement, and evolving military and civilian roles. It highlights rising domestic cybercrime, persistent attribution uncertainty in cross-border intrusions, and Chinese-cited 2011 indicators pointing to severe information-security challenges and a need for international cooperation.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1301 | U.S. AI Chip Export Rule to China: Permissive Pathway, Weak Guardrails, High Strategic Exposure | Export Controls | 2026-02-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1228 | U.S. Creates a Gated Export Corridor for AI Chips to China as Section 232 Tariffs Reshape Semiconductor Supply Chains | Semiconductors | 2026-02-16 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1191 | U.S. Rewires AI Chip Flows: Case-by-Case China Exports Paired With 25% Section 232 Tariff Gate | Semiconductors | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1177 | U.S. Eases AI Chip Export Stance as Mutual Supply-Chain Leverage Drives a Transactional Semiconductor Regime | Semiconductors | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1139 | BIS Shifts to Conditional Case-by-Case Licensing for Select AI Chips Bound for China | Export Controls | 2026-02-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1077 | Renewable Chokepoints: Why U.S. Semiconductor Controls Outlast Rare-Earth Pressure | China | 2026-02-13 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-839 | Deterrence and Escalation Dominance in the Taiwan Strait: Lessons from the 1996 Crisis | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-589 | U.S. AI Chip Export Rule to China: High-Volume Permissions, Low-Enforceability Guardrails | Export Controls | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-527 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Signals Intensify Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-466 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Intensified Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-243 | Managed De-Escalation: U.S. Case-by-Case AI Chip Licensing Meets China’s Temporary Critical-Materials Pause | Semiconductors | 2026-01-27 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-87 | U.S.-China Trade Enters a Securitized Era: Tariffs, Tech Controls, and Capital-Flow Friction Deepen | U.S.-China Trade | 2026-01-23 | 2 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-369 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-12-24 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-195 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drill Near Taiwan Highlights Deterrence Gaps and Delivery Bottlenecks | Taiwan | 2025-11-19 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-847 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-11-06 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1124 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-10-03 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-834 | Busan Summit Delivers Trade Truce, Defers Core U.S.-China Security Disputes | U.S.-China Relations | 2025-07-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-164 | China’s Cybersecurity Landscape: Fragmented Governance, Rising Domestic Threats, and Strategic Mistrust | Cybersecurity | 2012-07-27 | 1 | ACCESS » |