// Global Analysis Archive
A February 2026 source argues that no authoritative actor can confidently predict a PRC invasion of Taiwan by end-2026, with many assessments placing full-scale invasion below a 50% probability. The article suggests gray-zone pressure and potential limited escalation, including blockade scenarios, are more likely near-term pathways despite improving PLA capabilities and persistent reunification messaging.
The source argues that several international claims about the Taliban’s January 2026 criminal procedure code overstate what the Pashto statutory text explicitly establishes. It nonetheless assesses the code as strategically significant for consolidating judicial discretion, weakening procedural safeguards, and expanding reliance on uncodified jurisprudence.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and more strongly shaped by internal schedules, holidays, and weather than by external political triggers. The source argues that much apparent signalling may be opportunistic framing of planned readiness and training cycles, complicating event-based attribution and warning models.
A review of 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal readiness cycles, domestic calendars, and weather rather than external political triggers. The source argues this pattern reflects systematic preparation and operational normalisation, with political justifications often applied after the fact.
A February 2026 source argues that no authoritative actor can confidently predict a PRC invasion of Taiwan by end-2026, with many assessments placing full-scale invasion below a 50% probability. The article suggests gray-zone pressure and potential limited escalation, including blockade scenarios, are more likely near-term pathways despite improving PLA capabilities and persistent reunification messaging.
The source argues that several international claims about the Taliban’s January 2026 criminal procedure code overstate what the Pashto statutory text explicitly establishes. It nonetheless assesses the code as strategically significant for consolidating judicial discretion, weakening procedural safeguards, and expanding reliance on uncodified jurisprudence.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and more strongly shaped by internal schedules, holidays, and weather than by external political triggers. The source argues that much apparent signalling may be opportunistic framing of planned readiness and training cycles, complicating event-based attribution and warning models.
A review of 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal readiness cycles, domestic calendars, and weather rather than external political triggers. The source argues this pattern reflects systematic preparation and operational normalisation, with political justifications often applied after the fact.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1126 | Taiwan 2026: Rising Risk, but Coercion Still Assessed More Likely Than Invasion | Taiwan | 2026-02-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-499 | Afghanistan’s January 2026 Criminal Procedure Code: What the Text Codifies vs. What Reporting Implies | Afghanistan | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-3109 | Taiwan Strait 2025: PLA Activity Looks Increasingly Like Scheduled Preparation, Not Event-Driven Signalling | China | 2025-11-09 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-2783 | From Signalling to Schedule: What 2025 Activity Suggests About China’s Taiwan Posture | China | 2025-10-26 | 0 | ACCESS » |