// Global Analysis Archive
The source argues Beijing may seek to bypass traditional deterrence by using gray-zone quarantine tactics that exploit legal ambiguity and market reactions rather than initiating a clear invasion. Taiwan’s energy dependence and LNG replenishment timelines are presented as key vulnerabilities that could compress decision-making and strain allied coordination.
The source argues Beijing may seek political outcomes in the Taiwan Strait through a calibrated ‘paralysis’ strategy that leverages legal ambiguity, market disruption, and coalition decision delays rather than a rapid amphibious invasion. Late-December 2025 air, naval, coast guard, and rocket activity is presented as indicative of a potential quarantine approach that could pressure Taiwan’s energy security and commercial access without a clear war threshold.
The source argues that Elbridge Colby’s late-January 2026 visits to South Korea and Japan were designed to operationalize the Pentagon’s new deterrence-by-denial approach along the First Island Chain through greater allied burden-sharing and interoperability. It suggests that while trilateral mechanisms are maturing, political ambiguity—especially around Taiwan—could slow decision-making and weaken cohesion in a fast-moving crisis.
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te pledged to strengthen defence and public security in a Chinese New Year message filmed at a key radar station and featuring imagery of a domestically developed submarine in trials. The report also highlights domestic legislative resistance to Lai’s proposed US$40 billion defence spending plan, creating uncertainty over procurement timelines amid ongoing cross-strait tensions.
The source argues Beijing may seek to bypass invasion-centric deterrence by using a gray-zone quarantine that leverages legal ambiguity and market self-deterrence to disrupt Taiwan’s economy and decision-making. It highlights Taiwan’s LNG dependence and short reserve window as a key vulnerability that could compress political timelines before allies reach consensus on escalation.
The source argues that Beijing may seek political outcomes in the Taiwan Strait through a coercive “paralysis” strategy centered on quarantine-like measures, legal ambiguity, and market disruption rather than an immediate amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy dependence and the speed of commercial risk reactions as potential mechanisms to outpace allied decision-making and fracture consensus.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast than recent precedents and used multi-zone maritime activity consistent with rehearsals for constraining key air and sea routes. The episode also functioned as strategic signaling toward potential U.S. involvement, while analysts cited in the source questioned long-duration blockade sustainment under contested conditions.
The source argues PRC operations around Taiwan may be designed less to rehearse invasion than to rehearse a gray-zone quarantine that immobilizes Taiwan and delays allied decision-making. By leveraging legal ambiguity and market reactions—especially around energy shipping—coercion could accumulate without a clear threshold event that triggers unified intervention.
The source argues Beijing may prioritize a coercive “paralysis” strategy—using ambiguous, incremental quarantine-like pressure—to immobilize Taiwan and slow allied decision-making rather than immediately pursue an amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy import dependence and market-driven shipping/insurance dynamics as key levers that could generate rapid economic pressure under legally reversible, gray-zone enforcement.
The source argues Beijing’s recent Taiwan-adjacent operations may be less about imminent invasion and more about a gray-zone quarantine strategy that externalizes risk to markets and slows allied decision-making. By exploiting legal ambiguity and Taiwan’s energy-import dependence, such pressure could coerce accommodation without crossing a single, unmistakable war threshold.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
Source material describes PLA Eastern Theater Command’s late-2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercise emphasizing interdiction and strike operations around Taiwan, alongside Taiwan’s expanded layered denial concepts and early-2026 anti-landing drills. It also highlights emerging U.S.–Taiwan institutional cooperation on asymmetric joint fires, suggesting a continued shift toward drone- and missile-centric air and maritime denial planning.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside expanded CCG activity and large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. The document also highlights PLA training emphasizing leadership-targeting concepts and Taiwan’s steps to strengthen presidential security air defenses, amid a major US–Taiwan trade and semiconductor investment arrangement.
The source argues that PRC escalation in the Taiwan Strait has historically been driven primarily by perceived threats to political narratives and status-quo objectives rather than by the mere presence of U.S. military power. It concludes that deterrence and crisis management should account for political signaling risks while preserving credible defensive options, though the contemporary section is truncated due to extraction errors.
Taiwan’s absence from the newly released 2026 US National Defence Strategy is being interpreted in Taipei as a potential shift in Washington’s public signalling amid efforts to stabilise ties with Beijing. The contrast with the 2022 strategy’s explicit Taiwan language is driving domestic debate over deterrence credibility and the risk of misperception.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
CGTN frames a prospective Trump-era China approach as a dual-track mix of engagement and pressure. The source emphasizes that the primary danger is misjudging core interests and misreading defensive signals, which could accelerate escalation in contested arenas.
The source argues that South Korea’s unification-first doctrine is increasingly misaligned with North Korea’s nuclear posture, great-power constraints, and rising economic and social integration costs. It recommends a formal shift to managed coexistence under a permanent two-state framework, supported by institutional reform and major-power diplomacy.
China’s defence ministry said attempts to contain China are “doomed to fail,” while expressing willingness to work with Washington ahead of a reported April Trump–Xi meeting. The US 2026 National Defense Strategy, as described by the source, promotes “respectful relations” but continues to prioritise Indo-Pacific deterrence and denial capabilities along the First Island Chain.
The source characterizes China’s late-2025 “2025 Justice Mission” exercise as a multi-purpose operation combining Taiwan-focused rehearsal, A2/AD signalling, and political messaging to the US and Japan. It suggests the drill’s incremental “firsts” increased pressure near Taiwan’s waters while avoiding higher-risk live-fire actions that could expose capability limits or trigger escalation ahead of anticipated 2026 diplomacy.
The source argues that President Lee Jae-myung’s engagement-first approach is constrained by North Korea’s increased leverage, particularly through deepening ties with Russia after the Ukraine war. It suggests Seoul may pivot to a dual-track strategy combining accelerated defense modernization—highlighting nuclear-powered submarines—with broader multilateral diplomacy that brings European partners into a North Korea framework.
Turkish FM Hakan Fidan warned that Israel appears to be seeking an opportunity to strike Iran, arguing such action would further destabilise the region. The report also highlights intensified US-Iran deterrence signalling, including reported US naval movements and Iranian statements that any attack would be treated as an all-out war.
China’s late-December 2025 drills around Taiwan reportedly moved closer to the island and emphasized route-denial mechanics consistent with selective blockade concepts. The activity also appeared designed to deter or complicate external involvement while exposing ongoing questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged blockade operations under contestation.
Late-December PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast and rehearsed elements consistent with blocking major air and sea routes, according to the source. Taiwan reported elevated sorties, median-line crossings, and civilian flight disruption, while analysts debated the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
China’s PLA conducted two days of drills around Taiwan on Dec. 29–30, including activity near the contiguous zone and simulated blockage of key air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited assess the drills as the largest since 2022, highlighting blockade signaling, civil disruption effects, and open questions about PLA sustainment under contested conditions.
The source argues Beijing may seek to bypass traditional deterrence by using gray-zone quarantine tactics that exploit legal ambiguity and market reactions rather than initiating a clear invasion. Taiwan’s energy dependence and LNG replenishment timelines are presented as key vulnerabilities that could compress decision-making and strain allied coordination.
The source argues Beijing may seek political outcomes in the Taiwan Strait through a calibrated ‘paralysis’ strategy that leverages legal ambiguity, market disruption, and coalition decision delays rather than a rapid amphibious invasion. Late-December 2025 air, naval, coast guard, and rocket activity is presented as indicative of a potential quarantine approach that could pressure Taiwan’s energy security and commercial access without a clear war threshold.
The source argues that Elbridge Colby’s late-January 2026 visits to South Korea and Japan were designed to operationalize the Pentagon’s new deterrence-by-denial approach along the First Island Chain through greater allied burden-sharing and interoperability. It suggests that while trilateral mechanisms are maturing, political ambiguity—especially around Taiwan—could slow decision-making and weaken cohesion in a fast-moving crisis.
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te pledged to strengthen defence and public security in a Chinese New Year message filmed at a key radar station and featuring imagery of a domestically developed submarine in trials. The report also highlights domestic legislative resistance to Lai’s proposed US$40 billion defence spending plan, creating uncertainty over procurement timelines amid ongoing cross-strait tensions.
The source argues Beijing may seek to bypass invasion-centric deterrence by using a gray-zone quarantine that leverages legal ambiguity and market self-deterrence to disrupt Taiwan’s economy and decision-making. It highlights Taiwan’s LNG dependence and short reserve window as a key vulnerability that could compress political timelines before allies reach consensus on escalation.
The source argues that Beijing may seek political outcomes in the Taiwan Strait through a coercive “paralysis” strategy centered on quarantine-like measures, legal ambiguity, and market disruption rather than an immediate amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy dependence and the speed of commercial risk reactions as potential mechanisms to outpace allied decision-making and fracture consensus.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast than recent precedents and used multi-zone maritime activity consistent with rehearsals for constraining key air and sea routes. The episode also functioned as strategic signaling toward potential U.S. involvement, while analysts cited in the source questioned long-duration blockade sustainment under contested conditions.
The source argues PRC operations around Taiwan may be designed less to rehearse invasion than to rehearse a gray-zone quarantine that immobilizes Taiwan and delays allied decision-making. By leveraging legal ambiguity and market reactions—especially around energy shipping—coercion could accumulate without a clear threshold event that triggers unified intervention.
The source argues Beijing may prioritize a coercive “paralysis” strategy—using ambiguous, incremental quarantine-like pressure—to immobilize Taiwan and slow allied decision-making rather than immediately pursue an amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy import dependence and market-driven shipping/insurance dynamics as key levers that could generate rapid economic pressure under legally reversible, gray-zone enforcement.
The source argues Beijing’s recent Taiwan-adjacent operations may be less about imminent invasion and more about a gray-zone quarantine strategy that externalizes risk to markets and slows allied decision-making. By exploiting legal ambiguity and Taiwan’s energy-import dependence, such pressure could coerce accommodation without crossing a single, unmistakable war threshold.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
Source material describes PLA Eastern Theater Command’s late-2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercise emphasizing interdiction and strike operations around Taiwan, alongside Taiwan’s expanded layered denial concepts and early-2026 anti-landing drills. It also highlights emerging U.S.–Taiwan institutional cooperation on asymmetric joint fires, suggesting a continued shift toward drone- and missile-centric air and maritime denial planning.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside expanded CCG activity and large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. The document also highlights PLA training emphasizing leadership-targeting concepts and Taiwan’s steps to strengthen presidential security air defenses, amid a major US–Taiwan trade and semiconductor investment arrangement.
The source argues that PRC escalation in the Taiwan Strait has historically been driven primarily by perceived threats to political narratives and status-quo objectives rather than by the mere presence of U.S. military power. It concludes that deterrence and crisis management should account for political signaling risks while preserving credible defensive options, though the contemporary section is truncated due to extraction errors.
Taiwan’s absence from the newly released 2026 US National Defence Strategy is being interpreted in Taipei as a potential shift in Washington’s public signalling amid efforts to stabilise ties with Beijing. The contrast with the 2022 strategy’s explicit Taiwan language is driving domestic debate over deterrence credibility and the risk of misperception.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
CGTN frames a prospective Trump-era China approach as a dual-track mix of engagement and pressure. The source emphasizes that the primary danger is misjudging core interests and misreading defensive signals, which could accelerate escalation in contested arenas.
The source argues that South Korea’s unification-first doctrine is increasingly misaligned with North Korea’s nuclear posture, great-power constraints, and rising economic and social integration costs. It recommends a formal shift to managed coexistence under a permanent two-state framework, supported by institutional reform and major-power diplomacy.
China’s defence ministry said attempts to contain China are “doomed to fail,” while expressing willingness to work with Washington ahead of a reported April Trump–Xi meeting. The US 2026 National Defense Strategy, as described by the source, promotes “respectful relations” but continues to prioritise Indo-Pacific deterrence and denial capabilities along the First Island Chain.
The source characterizes China’s late-2025 “2025 Justice Mission” exercise as a multi-purpose operation combining Taiwan-focused rehearsal, A2/AD signalling, and political messaging to the US and Japan. It suggests the drill’s incremental “firsts” increased pressure near Taiwan’s waters while avoiding higher-risk live-fire actions that could expose capability limits or trigger escalation ahead of anticipated 2026 diplomacy.
The source argues that President Lee Jae-myung’s engagement-first approach is constrained by North Korea’s increased leverage, particularly through deepening ties with Russia after the Ukraine war. It suggests Seoul may pivot to a dual-track strategy combining accelerated defense modernization—highlighting nuclear-powered submarines—with broader multilateral diplomacy that brings European partners into a North Korea framework.
Turkish FM Hakan Fidan warned that Israel appears to be seeking an opportunity to strike Iran, arguing such action would further destabilise the region. The report also highlights intensified US-Iran deterrence signalling, including reported US naval movements and Iranian statements that any attack would be treated as an all-out war.
China’s late-December 2025 drills around Taiwan reportedly moved closer to the island and emphasized route-denial mechanics consistent with selective blockade concepts. The activity also appeared designed to deter or complicate external involvement while exposing ongoing questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged blockade operations under contestation.
Late-December PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast and rehearsed elements consistent with blocking major air and sea routes, according to the source. Taiwan reported elevated sorties, median-line crossings, and civilian flight disruption, while analysts debated the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
China’s PLA conducted two days of drills around Taiwan on Dec. 29–30, including activity near the contiguous zone and simulated blockage of key air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited assess the drills as the largest since 2022, highlighting blockade signaling, civil disruption effects, and open questions about PLA sustainment under contested conditions.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1390 | Taiwan Strait Coercion: How a Quarantine Strategy Could Bypass Invasion-Centric Deterrence | China | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1248 | Deterrence by Denial May Be Outpaced: PRC Quarantine Scenarios and the Taiwan Strait’s ‘Paralysis’ Risk | Taiwan | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1204 | Colby’s Northeast Asia Tour Signals a Denial-Deterrence Push for Japan–Korea–US Trilateral Readiness | Indo-Pacific | 2026-02-16 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1176 | Lai Signals Taiwan Defence Push in Lunar New Year Address Amid Budget Gridlock | Taiwan | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1163 | Deterrence Bypassed: How a PRC Quarantine Strategy Could Pressure Taiwan Without War | Taiwan | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1038 | Deterrence Bypassed: How a PRC Quarantine Strategy Could Paralyze Taiwan Without a Shot | Taiwan | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1036 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-993 | Deterrence by Denial vs. Coercive Quarantine: How Taiwan Strait Pressure Could Target Markets and Decision Cycles | China | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-960 | Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: How a Quarantine Strategy Could Bypass Red Lines | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-930 | Deterrence by Denial May Be Bypassed: The Quarantine-Paralysis Challenge in the Taiwan Strait | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-839 | Deterrence and Escalation Dominance in the Taiwan Strait: Lessons from the 1996 Crisis | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-719 | Taiwan Strait Posture Shifts: PLA Blockade Signaling Meets Taiwan’s Layered Denial Push | China | 2026-02-05 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-559 | PLA Airspace Threshold-Test Over Pratas Signals Intensifying Gray-Zone Pressure on Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-530 | Reassessing Beijing’s Taiwan Redlines: Political Triggers, Not Force Posture, Drive Escalation | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-469 | Taiwan Omitted from 2026 US Defence Strategy, Fueling Deterrence Signalling Concerns in Taipei | Taiwan | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-466 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Intensified Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-460 | Velvet Glove, Iron Fist: Managing Miscalculation in Trump’s 2026 China Posture | US-China Relations | 2026-01-31 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-361 | The Unification Paradox: Seoul’s Case for a Permanent Two-State Strategy | Korean Peninsula | 2026-01-30 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-339 | Beijing Rejects ‘Containment’ as US 2026 Defense Strategy Signals Deterrence with Softer Tone | China-US Relations | 2026-01-29 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-194 | China’s “2025 Justice Mission” Drill: Incremental Pressure, Managed Escalation, and Diminishing Deterrent Returns | PLA | 2026-01-25 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-144 | Lee Jae-myung’s Peace Agenda Meets a New Strategic Reality on the Korean Peninsula | South Korea | 2026-01-24 | 4 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-127 | Türkiye Warns of Israel-Iran Strike Window as US Naval Posture Tightens in the Gulf | Türkiye | 2026-01-24 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-620 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Near-Taiwan Drills Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Counter-Intervention Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-12-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1387 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Highlight Route-Denial Signaling and Escalation Risk | Taiwan Strait | 2025-11-25 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-847 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-11-06 | 0 | ACCESS » |