// Global Analysis Archive
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source argues that China-Pakistan relations remain strategically resilient, driven by defense cooperation and Beijing’s interest in Pakistan as a counterweight to India. However, the viability of a renewed economic partnership via “CPEC 2.0” hinges on Pakistan’s security environment, fiscal constraints, and the complications introduced by improving U.S.-Pakistan ties.
Japan and the Philippines are expanding defense cooperation through the RAA, OSA, and ACSA, enabling more regular and scalable joint operations along the First Island Chain. The source suggests this is stitching together the East China Sea and South China Sea into a more connected theater, complicating China’s ability to manage maritime tensions as separate fronts.
According to the source, the USS Cincinnati’s January 2026 visit to Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base marks the first U.S. warship port call at a facility recently upgraded with China-funded infrastructure. The event underscores a broader U.S.-Cambodia rapprochement while leaving unresolved questions about future access patterns and strategic influence at Ream.
PLA Eastern Theater Command drills on Dec. 29–30 operated unusually close to Taiwan’s coast and emphasized simulated blockage of key air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited highlight both the coercive signaling value and the unresolved question of whether the PLA could sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source portrays 2025 as a year of stagnation in U.S.-Indonesia relations, dominated by tariff negotiations and lacking major new economic or security agreements. Ongoing exercises and education cooperation remain bright spots, but reduced U.S. attention and Indonesia’s expanding deals with other major powers could widen strategic divergence.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source argues that China-Pakistan relations remain strategically resilient, driven by defense cooperation and Beijing’s interest in Pakistan as a counterweight to India. However, the viability of a renewed economic partnership via “CPEC 2.0” hinges on Pakistan’s security environment, fiscal constraints, and the complications introduced by improving U.S.-Pakistan ties.
Japan and the Philippines are expanding defense cooperation through the RAA, OSA, and ACSA, enabling more regular and scalable joint operations along the First Island Chain. The source suggests this is stitching together the East China Sea and South China Sea into a more connected theater, complicating China’s ability to manage maritime tensions as separate fronts.
According to the source, the USS Cincinnati’s January 2026 visit to Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base marks the first U.S. warship port call at a facility recently upgraded with China-funded infrastructure. The event underscores a broader U.S.-Cambodia rapprochement while leaving unresolved questions about future access patterns and strategic influence at Ream.
PLA Eastern Theater Command drills on Dec. 29–30 operated unusually close to Taiwan’s coast and emphasized simulated blockage of key air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited highlight both the coercive signaling value and the unresolved question of whether the PLA could sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source portrays 2025 as a year of stagnation in U.S.-Indonesia relations, dominated by tariff negotiations and lacking major new economic or security agreements. Ongoing exercises and education cooperation remain bright spots, but reduced U.S. attention and Indonesia’s expanding deals with other major powers could widen strategic divergence.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1246 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and External Deterrence | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-701 | China-Pakistan Ties at 75: Defense Momentum, CPEC 2.0, and the New U.S. Factor | China-Pakistan | 2026-02-05 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-508 | Japan–Philippines Defense Integration Links East and South China Sea Dynamics | Japan | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-242 | US Warship’s First Ream Port Call Signals Cambodia’s Bid to Rebalance Between Washington and Beijing | Cambodia | 2026-01-27 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1330 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-10-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-240 | US–Indonesia Ties in 2025: Transactional Bargaining, Diplomatic Gaps, and Strategic Drift | United States | 2025-07-25 | 1 | ACCESS » |