// Global Analysis Archive
The source argues PRC operations around Taiwan may be designed less to rehearse invasion than to rehearse a gray-zone quarantine that immobilizes Taiwan and delays allied decision-making. By leveraging legal ambiguity and market reactions—especially around energy shipping—coercion could accumulate without a clear threshold event that triggers unified intervention.
ASPI-linked 2025 tracking data suggests Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is now near-continuous and shaped more by internal readiness cycles, holidays, and weather than by external political triggers. The pattern implies a shift from episodic signalling toward routinized coercion and systematic preparation conducted on Beijing’s timetable.
ASPI’s 2025 tracking data indicates Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is nearly continuous, with fluctuations more closely tied to weather, holidays, and internal political-security calendars than to external events. The source argues that many actions framed as responses to provocation are better understood as routine readiness-building and planned training, with signalling increasingly secondary.
The source assesses that a Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan in 2026 is unlikely, with Beijing expected to continue coercive measures that erode Taiwan’s will while preserving escalation flexibility. Despite reported military capability gains in 2025, leadership reliability concerns, uncertain external intervention, Taiwan’s deterrence improvements, and China’s domestic economic constraints are presented as key factors discouraging major force.
ASPI-linked 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal schedules, weather constraints, and readiness objectives. The source argues many apparent ‘signals’ are better understood as routine preparation with external events used for opportunistic justification.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests China’s military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal readiness cycles, holidays and weather rather than external political triggers. The source argues that many apparent ‘signals’ function as opportunistic justifications for planned operations, indicating systematic preparation on Beijing’s timetable.
The source argues PRC operations around Taiwan may be designed less to rehearse invasion than to rehearse a gray-zone quarantine that immobilizes Taiwan and delays allied decision-making. By leveraging legal ambiguity and market reactions—especially around energy shipping—coercion could accumulate without a clear threshold event that triggers unified intervention.
ASPI-linked 2025 tracking data suggests Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is now near-continuous and shaped more by internal readiness cycles, holidays, and weather than by external political triggers. The pattern implies a shift from episodic signalling toward routinized coercion and systematic preparation conducted on Beijing’s timetable.
ASPI’s 2025 tracking data indicates Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is nearly continuous, with fluctuations more closely tied to weather, holidays, and internal political-security calendars than to external events. The source argues that many actions framed as responses to provocation are better understood as routine readiness-building and planned training, with signalling increasingly secondary.
The source assesses that a Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan in 2026 is unlikely, with Beijing expected to continue coercive measures that erode Taiwan’s will while preserving escalation flexibility. Despite reported military capability gains in 2025, leadership reliability concerns, uncertain external intervention, Taiwan’s deterrence improvements, and China’s domestic economic constraints are presented as key factors discouraging major force.
ASPI-linked 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal schedules, weather constraints, and readiness objectives. The source argues many apparent ‘signals’ are better understood as routine preparation with external events used for opportunistic justification.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests China’s military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal readiness cycles, holidays and weather rather than external political triggers. The source argues that many apparent ‘signals’ function as opportunistic justifications for planned operations, indicating systematic preparation on Beijing’s timetable.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-993 | Deterrence by Denial vs. Coercive Quarantine: How Taiwan Strait Pressure Could Target Markets and Decision Cycles | China | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-317 | Routine Pressure, Not Reactive Signalling: What 2025 Patterns Suggest About China’s Taiwan Operations | China | 2025-12-25 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1247 | Beyond Signalling: 2025 Patterns Suggest China’s Taiwan Operations Follow Internal Readiness Cycles | China | 2025-12-06 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1332 | Why Beijing Is Likely to Intensify Coercion—Not War—Over Taiwan in 2026 | China | 2025-11-25 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-188 | Taiwan Strait 2025: PLA Operational Tempo Looks Increasingly Driven by Internal Readiness Cycles | China | 2025-09-12 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-963 | Taiwan Strait 2025: Continuous PLA Presence Points to Readiness Cycles Over Reactive Signalling | China | 2025-09-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |