// Global Analysis Archive
The source argues that senior personnel investigations in early 2026 are occurring alongside accelerating PLA capability development, with large-scale exercises through late 2025 framed as cumulative preparation for Taiwan contingencies. It highlights Justice Mission 2025, growing maritime-coercion integration, and potential Maritime Militia massing as indicators of expanding options short of invasion while logistics and joint-integration constraints persist.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 29–30, 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” drills as the largest near Taiwan in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style operations, extensive air activity, and live-fire elements. The document suggests a broader pattern of iterative exercises since 2022, complemented by persistent patrol activity and capability experimentation, while raising questions about blockade sustainment under external interference.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style tactics and air/sea access disruption. Follow-on readiness indicators in early 2026 suggest continued capability refinement and elevated coercion risks even absent confirmation of active exercises by mid-February 2026.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast than recent precedents and used multi-zone maritime activity consistent with rehearsals for constraining key air and sea routes. The episode also functioned as strategic signaling toward potential U.S. involvement, while analysts cited in the source questioned long-duration blockade sustainment under contested conditions.
Source material indicates China expanded the scale and proximity of PLA exercises around Taiwan in December 2025, emphasizing blockade practice, high-tempo air operations, and amphibious rapid assault elements. Reported January 2026 activity—including leadership-targeting training narratives and a possible Taiwanese airspace violation over Pratas—raises incident and miscalculation risks.
Source reporting describes large-scale PLA exercises near Taiwan in late 2025 focused on blockade simulation, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force integration. Follow-on nationwide drills in January 2026 and state-media-highlighted strike concepts suggest an effort to expand coercive options while increasing incident and escalation risks.
China’s Dec. 29–30 drills around Taiwan operated closer to the island than prior iterations and were assessed by analysts as the largest since 2022, emphasizing route denial and blockade-relevant tactics. The activity also served strategic signaling toward the United States, while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
Source reporting describes near-continuous PLA activity around Taiwan in 2025, with large-scale December drills focused on blockade-style operations and high sortie rates. Early 2026 reporting highlights precision strike and special operations training alongside maritime militia-style massing, while questions persist about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contestation.
Source reporting indicates the PLA has expanded the scale, proximity, and complexity of exercises around Taiwan, emphasizing blockade-like operations and precision strike scenarios. Analysts cited in the source question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, even as operational pressure becomes more routine.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan as a large-scale rehearsal of blockade-like operations, including dense air and maritime activity and live-fire near the contiguous zone. Into early 2026, activity reportedly shifted toward normalized coercion, with lower ADIZ sortie levels but continued coast guard pressure near outlying islands.
Source reporting describes late-2025 PLA exercises near Taiwan as unusually large and close-in, emphasizing blockade simulation, joint operations, and precision-strike rehearsal. Continued activity into January 2026 suggests sustained pressure, though the source notes uncertainty about long-duration sustainment under external interference.
The source describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, featuring multi-zone maritime activity consistent with blockade rehearsal and high-tempo air operations. It also highlights uncertainty about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, alongside Taiwan’s subsequent counter-drills and U.S. calls for restraint.
Two days of PLA drills on Dec. 29–30 operated closer to Taiwan’s coast and were assessed by analysts in the source as the largest since 2022, with activity consistent with rehearsing blockade-relevant tasks. The episode also highlighted immediate coercive effects through civilian route disruption while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
According to the source, China’s December 29–30, 2025 exercises near Taiwan featured live-fire activity and simulated blockade operations, marking the largest-scale drills in over three years. Taiwan’s subsequent high-visibility defensive drills and U.S. calls for de-escalation highlight a sustained signaling cycle with elevated operational and civilian-disruption risks.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 drills as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade simulation, closer-in fires, and high-tempo air operations while omitting aircraft carriers. Taiwan’s layered defense drills and U.S. calls for restraint highlight rising escalation risks and an intensifying action–reaction cycle.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” drills as a large-scale blockade-oriented exercise package near Taiwan, followed by January 2026 indications of expanded strike and raid training scenarios. Taiwan’s counter-drills and U.S. criticism highlight a tightening action–reaction cycle with elevated risks of miscalculation and episodic coercion short of war.
The source describes large-scale PLA drills near Taiwan in late December 2025, followed by continued high-tempo activity into January 2026, interpreted by analysts as rehearsal for coercive options such as blockade-like operations. The pattern suggests a move from episodic signaling to normalized pressure designed to test responses and shape the operating environment, while sustainment in a prolonged contingency remains an open question.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PLA exercise near Taiwan featuring closer operating areas, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force elements consistent with blockade and precision-strike rehearsal. The same document notes potential sustainability constraints for prolonged blockade operations, but indicates rising crisis instability due to proximity operations and unmanned activity.
Source reporting indicates the PLA intensified activity around Taiwan in late 2025 and early 2026, including large-scale “Justice Mission 2025” drills and a reported drone overflight of Pratas (Dongsha) Island. The pattern suggests increasing operational realism—blockade rehearsal, joint strike training, and leadership-targeting messaging—while elevating risks of miscalculation and commercial disruption.
Late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan featured unusually close-in activity and were described as practice for disrupting major air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited in the document assess the drills as a blockade-style test run and a strategic signal aimed at deterring potential U.S. involvement while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.
China’s late-December 2025 drills around Taiwan reportedly moved closer to the island and emphasized route-denial mechanics consistent with selective blockade concepts. The activity also appeared designed to deter or complicate external involvement while exposing ongoing questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged blockade operations under contestation.
China’s Dec. 29–30, 2025 drills near Taiwan featured close-in activity and high sortie counts that analysts characterize as a practical demonstration of blockade-related tactics. The episode underscores coercive leverage through civilian disruption while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source argues that senior personnel investigations in early 2026 are occurring alongside accelerating PLA capability development, with large-scale exercises through late 2025 framed as cumulative preparation for Taiwan contingencies. It highlights Justice Mission 2025, growing maritime-coercion integration, and potential Maritime Militia massing as indicators of expanding options short of invasion while logistics and joint-integration constraints persist.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 29–30, 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” drills as the largest near Taiwan in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style operations, extensive air activity, and live-fire elements. The document suggests a broader pattern of iterative exercises since 2022, complemented by persistent patrol activity and capability experimentation, while raising questions about blockade sustainment under external interference.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style tactics and air/sea access disruption. Follow-on readiness indicators in early 2026 suggest continued capability refinement and elevated coercion risks even absent confirmation of active exercises by mid-February 2026.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast than recent precedents and used multi-zone maritime activity consistent with rehearsals for constraining key air and sea routes. The episode also functioned as strategic signaling toward potential U.S. involvement, while analysts cited in the source questioned long-duration blockade sustainment under contested conditions.
Source material indicates China expanded the scale and proximity of PLA exercises around Taiwan in December 2025, emphasizing blockade practice, high-tempo air operations, and amphibious rapid assault elements. Reported January 2026 activity—including leadership-targeting training narratives and a possible Taiwanese airspace violation over Pratas—raises incident and miscalculation risks.
Source reporting describes large-scale PLA exercises near Taiwan in late 2025 focused on blockade simulation, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force integration. Follow-on nationwide drills in January 2026 and state-media-highlighted strike concepts suggest an effort to expand coercive options while increasing incident and escalation risks.
China’s Dec. 29–30 drills around Taiwan operated closer to the island than prior iterations and were assessed by analysts as the largest since 2022, emphasizing route denial and blockade-relevant tactics. The activity also served strategic signaling toward the United States, while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
Source reporting describes near-continuous PLA activity around Taiwan in 2025, with large-scale December drills focused on blockade-style operations and high sortie rates. Early 2026 reporting highlights precision strike and special operations training alongside maritime militia-style massing, while questions persist about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contestation.
Source reporting indicates the PLA has expanded the scale, proximity, and complexity of exercises around Taiwan, emphasizing blockade-like operations and precision strike scenarios. Analysts cited in the source question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, even as operational pressure becomes more routine.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan as a large-scale rehearsal of blockade-like operations, including dense air and maritime activity and live-fire near the contiguous zone. Into early 2026, activity reportedly shifted toward normalized coercion, with lower ADIZ sortie levels but continued coast guard pressure near outlying islands.
Source reporting describes late-2025 PLA exercises near Taiwan as unusually large and close-in, emphasizing blockade simulation, joint operations, and precision-strike rehearsal. Continued activity into January 2026 suggests sustained pressure, though the source notes uncertainty about long-duration sustainment under external interference.
The source describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, featuring multi-zone maritime activity consistent with blockade rehearsal and high-tempo air operations. It also highlights uncertainty about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, alongside Taiwan’s subsequent counter-drills and U.S. calls for restraint.
Two days of PLA drills on Dec. 29–30 operated closer to Taiwan’s coast and were assessed by analysts in the source as the largest since 2022, with activity consistent with rehearsing blockade-relevant tasks. The episode also highlighted immediate coercive effects through civilian route disruption while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
According to the source, China’s December 29–30, 2025 exercises near Taiwan featured live-fire activity and simulated blockade operations, marking the largest-scale drills in over three years. Taiwan’s subsequent high-visibility defensive drills and U.S. calls for de-escalation highlight a sustained signaling cycle with elevated operational and civilian-disruption risks.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA drills near Taiwan as a large-scale demonstration of blockade-relevant capabilities, including stand-off fires and high sortie rates with reported civil aviation disruption. The activity fits a broader post-2022 pattern of normalized encirclement operations, while questions remain about sustainability under logistics constraints and potential external interference.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 drills as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade simulation, closer-in fires, and high-tempo air operations while omitting aircraft carriers. Taiwan’s layered defense drills and U.S. calls for restraint highlight rising escalation risks and an intensifying action–reaction cycle.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” drills as a large-scale blockade-oriented exercise package near Taiwan, followed by January 2026 indications of expanded strike and raid training scenarios. Taiwan’s counter-drills and U.S. criticism highlight a tightening action–reaction cycle with elevated risks of miscalculation and episodic coercion short of war.
The source describes large-scale PLA drills near Taiwan in late December 2025, followed by continued high-tempo activity into January 2026, interpreted by analysts as rehearsal for coercive options such as blockade-like operations. The pattern suggests a move from episodic signaling to normalized pressure designed to test responses and shape the operating environment, while sustainment in a prolonged contingency remains an open question.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PLA exercise near Taiwan featuring closer operating areas, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force elements consistent with blockade and precision-strike rehearsal. The same document notes potential sustainability constraints for prolonged blockade operations, but indicates rising crisis instability due to proximity operations and unmanned activity.
Source reporting indicates the PLA intensified activity around Taiwan in late 2025 and early 2026, including large-scale “Justice Mission 2025” drills and a reported drone overflight of Pratas (Dongsha) Island. The pattern suggests increasing operational realism—blockade rehearsal, joint strike training, and leadership-targeting messaging—while elevating risks of miscalculation and commercial disruption.
Late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan featured unusually close-in activity and were described as practice for disrupting major air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited in the document assess the drills as a blockade-style test run and a strategic signal aimed at deterring potential U.S. involvement while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.
China’s late-December 2025 drills around Taiwan reportedly moved closer to the island and emphasized route-denial mechanics consistent with selective blockade concepts. The activity also appeared designed to deter or complicate external involvement while exposing ongoing questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged blockade operations under contestation.
China’s Dec. 29–30, 2025 drills near Taiwan featured close-in activity and high sortie counts that analysts characterize as a practical demonstration of blockade-related tactics. The episode underscores coercive leverage through civilian disruption while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1388 | Forest Over Trees: PLA Capability Growth Continues Amid Senior-Level Discipline Actions | PLA | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1386 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Normalizes Close-In Blockade Rehearsals Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1246 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and External Deterrence | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1160 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Blockade Simulation Near Taiwan Signals Evolving Coercive Playbook | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1123 | PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Drills Intensify: ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Sustained Cross-Strait Pressure | PLA | 2026-02-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1036 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1035 | PLA Raises Pressure on Taiwan with Blockade Rehearsals and Boundary-Testing Operations | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-992 | PLA’s Late-2025 Taiwan Drills Signal Blockade Readiness and Joint-Force Escalation into Early 2026 | PLA | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-961 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-959 | PLA Normalizes High-Tempo Operations Around Taiwan, Emphasizing Blockade and Precision Strike Training | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-929 | PLA Drills Around Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Escalation Testing | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-846 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Signal Blockade-Rehearsal Posture, Followed by Normalized Pressure in Early 2026 | PLA | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-816 | PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Drills Near Taiwan Signal Higher-Tempo Coercion Into 2026 | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-07 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-527 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Signals Intensify Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-512 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-510 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Blockade Signaling Near Taiwan and the Emerging Cycle of Counter-Readiness | PLA | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-466 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Intensified Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-456 | Justice Mission 2025 Signals a More Credible PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | PLA | 2026-01-31 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-368 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Blockade Rehearsal Signals a Higher-Tempo Taiwan Strait Posture | Taiwan Strait | 2026-01-30 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-314 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Shift Toward Routine, Blockade-Relevant Pressure on Taiwan | PLA | 2026-01-29 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-190 | PLA Expands Taiwan Pressure with Near-Baseline Drills and Blockade Rehearsals | PLA | 2026-01-25 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-185 | PLA Raises Operational Pressure Around Taiwan with Blockade-Style Drills and Airspace Probing | PLA | 2026-01-25 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-369 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-12-24 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-620 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Near-Taiwan Drills Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Counter-Intervention Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-12-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1161 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Highlight Blockade Signaling and Sustainment Questions | Taiwan Strait | 2025-12-09 | 0 | ACCESS » |